A team is told to report problems early. The first person to do so faces an angry meeting and weeks of scrutiny. The colleague who says nothing avoids the immediate cost. At the next meeting, the leader asks why nobody speaks up.
The team has already learned what speaking up costs.
Steven Kerr described this problem in his 1975 essay, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.” His examples included institutions whose reward systems encouraged behavior at odds with their stated aims.[1] The argument remains useful because it asks leaders to examine consequences before blaming the people responding to them.
In the Yes-Way, the Ground includes the consequences people learn to expect. Repeated decisions about attention, resources, approval, and protection help shape the culture.
Preferences have consequences
Han Feizi explored how rulers' preferences influence those around them. In “The Two Handles,” stories of extreme efforts to satisfy a ruler's tastes illustrate the dangers of making those tastes politically consequential.[2] His account belongs to a theory of power and control that the Yes-Way does not adopt.
The Analects offers a different view of leadership, comparing a ruler's influence to wind bending grass.[3] These traditions disagree about how to govern. Both, however, draw attention to how a leader's preferences affect other people.
People don't calculate every move for personal gain. They also act from care, conviction, and professional standards. A poor reward system can make it harder to honor those commitments.
What a target leaves out
Donald Campbell warned that when numbers carry high stakes, pressure to improve them can distort the work they are meant to measure.[4] Marilyn Strathern explored related problems in university auditing, drawing on Goodhart's observation about measures and targets.[5]
Measurement becomes a problem when one number stands in for the whole purpose. A count of completed calls doesn't tell you whether callers got useful help. A publication total doesn't tell you about the quality or integrity of the work.
In “Goals Gone Wild,” Lisa Ordóñez and colleagues reviewed possible side effects of goal setting, including narrow attention, risk-taking, and unethical conduct.[6] Edwin Locke and Gary Latham challenged their treatment of the evidence and defended properly designed goals.[7] The disagreement is a reason to examine how you set and use goals, rather than assume that ambition itself is harmful.
For each target, ask what a person could neglect while still appearing successful. Then ask how you would know. Quality checks, discussion, and professional judgment remain necessary when the number looks good.
When a fine changes the relationship
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini studied Israeli day-care centers that introduced a small fine for late pickups. Lateness increased after the fine was introduced and did not simply return to its earlier level when the fine was removed.[8]
The authors suggested that the fine changed what lateness meant: parents could treat it as a service they were paying for, rather than an obligation they had failed to meet. The finding came from a particular setting and fine. It doesn't mean every penalty backfires or that payment always undermines care.
An incentive can change what people think they owe each other, as well as how motivated they feel. Before introducing a reward or penalty, consider why people currently do the right thing and what your change might do to that reason.
Recognition and the AIRe question
My work with the AIRe framework connects recognition with learning and organizational practice. Developed by Vantage Circle, AIRe identifies Appreciation, Incentivization, Reinforcement, and Emotional Connect as themes for examining recognition.[9]
The Incentivization theme raises a practical question: what does recognition encourage, and what might it discourage? Rewarding visible individual achievements can leave necessary work unnoticed. Praising someone for helping a colleague means little if the time they spend helping makes them miss a competing target.
AIRe helps organize these questions. Using the framework doesn't establish that a recognition program works. You still need to examine its effects, including who benefits and who bears the cost.
Look at what actually happens
Choose three behaviors you want to encourage in one team. Describe them plainly: reporting an error promptly, sharing a useful method, or helping a colleague complete an unfamiliar task.
For each behavior, trace what happened the last time someone did it. Did it receive thanks, support, indifference, or an additional burden? Invite people to describe their experience privately. Do not assume the formal policy tells the whole story.
Now look at the alternative. What happens when someone hides an error or keeps useful knowledge to themselves? If that choice is easier and carries no obvious cost, you're asking people to accept a disadvantage each time they do what you want.
Change one consequence within your authority. Explain the reason and consider who might be affected. A change intended to encourage openness should not create a public contest over who admits the most mistakes.
Review the change after a month. Look for improvements and unintended effects. Has the work become fairer or more effective? An increase in the chosen number isn't enough to answer that.
People remain responsible for their choices, and leaders remain responsible for the conditions they maintain. Understanding why someone made a choice doesn't excuse every action, but it can show you where a change is needed.
Kerr's essay brings the question back to decisions you can influence. Before repeating a value, check what happens to people who act on it.
Notes and sources
- Kerr, Steven. "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B." Academy of Management Journal 18, no. 4 (1975): 769–783. https://doi.org/10.5465/255378 · Reprinted with update in Academy of Management Executive 9, no. 1 (1995): 7–14.Back to passage ↑
- Han Feizi. "The Two Handles", ch. 7. Paraphrased. https://ctext.org/hanfeizi/er-bingBack to passage ↑
- Confucius. Analects 12.19. Trans. James Legge (1861). Paraphrased. https://ctext.org/analects/yan-yuanBack to passage ↑
- Campbell, Donald T. "Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change." Evaluation and Program Planning 2, no. 1 (1979): 67–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/0149-7189(79)90048-XBack to passage ↑
- Strathern, Marilyn. "'Improving Ratings': Audit in the British University System." European Review 5, no. 3 (1997): 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798700002660Back to passage ↑
- Ordóñez, Lisa D., Maurice E. Schweitzer, Adam D. Galinsky, and Max H. Bazerman. "Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting." Academy of Management Perspectives 23, no. 1 (2009): 6–16. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2009.37007999Back to passage ↑
- Locke, Edwin A., and Gary P. Latham. "Has Goal Setting Gone Wild, or Have Its Attackers Abandoned Good Scholarship?" Academy of Management Perspectives 23, no. 1 (2009): 17–23. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2009.37008000Back to passage ↑
- Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. "A Fine Is a Price." Journal of Legal Studies 29, no. 1 (2000): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1086/468061Back to passage ↑
- Vantage Circle. "The AIRe Framework for Employee Recognition." AIRe is Vantage Circle's proprietary framework. https://www.vantagecircle.com/aire-framework-employee-recognition/Back to passage ↑